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PREFACE
The Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit has had a
long period of involvement with the Town Milk Industry. The
work carried out. by the AERU since 1972 has involved an
annual survey of town milk producers. This survey has
identified the cost of town milk production and was used as
the basis of the annual negotiation of town milk prices for
farmers.
The partial deregulation of the industry at the
beginning of 1988 resulted in the cost of production no
longer being the basis of the milk price; processing
companies must establish their own prices for farmers in
order to obtain the milk required.
The New Zealand Milk Board ceased to exist as part of
the deregulation process. Prior to the dissolving of the
Board, it was decided that three studies should be carried
out. One involved a survey of consumers in Auckland and
Christchurch with emphasis on milk purchasing, the home
vendor system and milk packaging, the second was a study of
the impact of deregulation on the town milk supply sector
and the third was a history of the Milk Board. The AERU was
asked to carry out all three studies.
The survey of Auckland and Christchurch consumers has
been reported in AERU Research Report No. 195 (July 1988).
The history of the Milk Board is being prepared. This
Discussion Paper provides the results of the review of the
supply side of the town milk industry.
The AERU has an ongoing interest in the study of
deregulation. (Research Report No. 193 provides a review of
the egg industry.) It is considered important to understand
the way in which industries adjust to changes in the
regulatory environment, especially when the deregulation
process has not been complete (as in both this case and the
egg industry). Optimal utilisation of resources in a
competitive environment is not an immediate outcome of
deregulation and there may be considerable uncertainty in
the short term. As the time since the partial deregulation
of the milk industry was not sufficient for the process to
have moved very far, this Discussion Paper can only provide
an indication of the direction in which changes are
occurring. Further study in a years time will be required
in order to provide a better assessment of the deregulation
changes.
Professor A C Zwart
DIRECTOR
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SUMMARY
The New Zealand town milk industry, as it has hecome
known, was established as an entity in 1944. Prior to that
time, milk supply to the urban areas was of variable quality
and dependability. In order to improve the quality of
supply, legislation was enacted which established the New
Zealand Milk Board. The Board had the responsibility to
control and regulate the industry with the objectives of
improving milk quality and ensuring an adequate supply of
milk to consumers on a year round basis.
In order to do this, a quota system was established
under which farmers guaranteed to supply high quality milk
on a year round basis in return for a guaranteed price. If
the supply was not maintained', penalties were imposed. The
quotas for each area were set by the Milk Board. In
addition, the Milk Board licensed milk processors in each
area to receive the milk and arrange the supply to
consumers. Milk vendors were appointed by the processors
but were under the "quality control" of the Milk Board.
Milk processors were responsible to the Board for the supply
in their areas. Decisions on processing and other than
normal day to day management matters were made by the Milk
Board.
Du~ing 1985, this system came under review by the
Industries Development Commission. As a result of the
report of the Commission and consequent discussions with the
industry, the Government introduced legislation which came
into effect on 1 April 1988 which partially deregulated the
town milk industry. The Milk Board was discontinued and
replaced by the New Zealand Milk Authority. The purpose of
the Act (Milk Act 1988) was "to provide for the continued
home delivery of milk; and to reduce in other respects the
regulation of the processing, supply, and distribution of
milk for human consumption".
Milk processors are now free to acquire milk in what
ever way is most suitable to them. The quotas are now the
responsibility of the milk processors. However, Milk
Authority functions are (inter alia) to license milk
processors, to allocate home delivery districts and to
influence retail price competition. This means that the
town milk industry is only partially deregulated. Obtaining
milk from farmers has been completely deregulated but the
processing and marketing of that milk is still subject to
controls.
As a result of the changes in the legislation, and in
the case of packaging, prior to the legislation changes,
there have been some significant developments in the town
milk industry. Cartons and plastic bottles are now
available as well as the traditional 600 ml glass bottle.
(ix)
There is some evidence that milk sales have increased since
the introduction of alternative packaging. In the upper
part of the North Island, the New Zealand Cooperative Dairy
Company (NZCDC) has become the major force in the town milk
industry through takeovers of smaller town milk processing
companies. Some of the smaller processing plants have been
closed and some town milk farmers are in the process of
having their quota removed. Other are opting to move into
factory supply rather than town supply. There is an
increasing move towards the introduction of winter milk
supply contracts with quotas being discontinued. This will
lead to some herds being calved in Spring and others in
Autumn. It has been suggested that this may lead to
increased variation in milk quality as the town milk is
drawn from different parts of the lactation time.
Combining of milk powder and UHT milk with fresh winter milk
has also been suggested as a possible option for winter
supply.
In the lower part of the North Island, some company
amalgamations have also occurred. The Manawatu company
appears to have established itself as the dominant entity.
However, the company movements have occurred within the town
milk industry rather than involving processing companies.
There is some evidence to suggest that there will be
increased town milk supply from new herds entering the
industry and that the quota system is likely to continue in
this area.
In the South Island, very little change has occurred.
There is a suggestion that Canterbury Dairy Farmers (CDF)
will emerge as the main competitive element with the
possibility of extending the range of influence to Timaru,
Oamaru and Dunedin. There appear to have been few changes
to the farmer quota system to date with the possibility of
exclusive winter contract production not being very
significant in this area. Difficulties with supply during
dry summer months are a continuing issue from Timaru to
Christchurch.
Further south, the Dunedin and Invercargill systems
appear to be continuing as they did in the past with company
directors expressing satisfaction with being able to control
their own operations. The quota system appears to be
remaining intact as the most efficient means of obtaining
milk throughout the year. The potential for competition
from CDF is recognised.
To date, the partial deregulation of the town milk
industry has resulted in significant company ownership
changes in the northern part of the North Island, some
changes in the supply arrangements in that area, some
consolidation of processing plant ownership in the southern
North Island and very little change in the South Island.
Continuing the industry monitoring process in order to
identify the impact of deregulation should be a priority for
future research.
(xl
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the three years from 1985 to 1988 the milk
industry has been the subject of review and examination.
During 1985 the industry underwent close examination by the
Industries Development Commission. The objective was to
seek ways of improving efficiency within the industry. It
was expected that this might be achieved by introducing
deregulation and encouraging competition. The Government's
commitment to maintaining the horne delivery service led to
some uncertainty and confusion over the benefits of
deregulation. This difficulty resulted in the Industries
Development Commission (IDC) being unable to agree. They
produced a majority and minority report, one advocating
widespread deregulation and the other a continuation of the
traditional horne delivery service under NZ Milk Board
control.
The uncertainty of the IDC report led the Government
to seek further submissions. It later introduced a number
of new policy changes during 1986. These incorporated some
deregulation measures including the introduction of
alternative milk packaging. In 1987 the Government accepted
a plan for the progressive deregulation of the industry and
new legislation was drawn up.
The new legislation (known as the Milk Act 1988)
attempts to balance the objectives of encouraging
competition through deregulation while maintaining a viable
home delivery service. The NZ Milk Board was abolished and
many of its functions handed over to the milk processing
companies. A new Authority (known as "the New Zealand Milk
Authority) replaces the Milk Board. The Authority
(comprising three Government appointees) has the following
functions:
»(a) To License milk processors;
(b) To determine, allocate, modify, and reallocate
home delivery districts; .
(c) To determine the retail price differential for
milk under Section 18(1) of this Act;
(d) To monitor the supply of milk, the delivery of
milk to domestic consumers of horne delivery
districts by and on behalf of processors, and
the retail prices of milk;
(e) To report to ~he Minister on matters relating to
the sale or delivery of milk;
(f) Any other functions conferred on it by this Act
or any other enactment" (Milk Act, 1988).
- 1 -
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Chapter 2 describes the various elements of the
industry before deregulation. An assessment is made of the
value of town milk producers' quota rights and the costs of
winter milk production. In Chapter 3 the new policy changes
are reviewed. Chapter 4 considers some of the industry
responses since deregulation and discusses some effects of
deregulation on town milk supplies.
CHAPTER 2
DESCRIPrION OF THE INDUSTRY PRIOR TO
PARTIAL DEREGULATION
2.1 Structure of the Industry
The farming sector o.f the New Zealand dairy industry
numbers over 16,000 farmers but less than 1,300 supply the
town milk market. The total annual production of milk
exceeds seven million tonnes with 90 per cent of this milk
used in the manufacture of dairy products (eg. butter,
cheese, casein and milk powder). Over 85 per cent of these
manufactured milk products are exported. Nearly five per
cent of the milk produced is consumed by sales of liquid
milk and cream by the town milk industry (33 million litres
in 1986-87). The balance is used by the yoghurt and other
cultured dairy foods industry.
Concern over the quality of milk supplied to local
consumers led to the passing of the Milk Act 1944. This
legislation established the NZ Milk Board which was expected
to administer the supply of milk to New Zealand consumers
and resulted in the formal establishment of a Town Milk
industry. The main objective was the establishment of a
year round supply of high quality milk for New Zealand
consumers.
The production, supply, collection, treatment,
storage, distribution, delivery and sale of town milk was
therefore organised separately from the dairy manufacturing
sector. The formation of the town milk sector of the New
Zealand dairy industry was due to the year-round daily
requirement for fresh milk. It also reflected the location
of town milk farms close to centres of population. This
helped minimize transport costs. However, in contrast with
other dairy farms producing milk for manufacturing, town
milk farms were seldom located on the optimum soils in the
best climatic regions. In addition, milk production is
costly during the colder winter months when per cow
production is low and feed costs are high. This loss of
comparative advantage resulted in higher payments being
needed by town milk producers who were required to produce
milk each day of the year.
The payment made to the many producers of
manufacturing milk has always been related to prices
received for exported dairy products. The town milk
producer price has been linked to manufacturing pr1ces, and
a premium has been paid which reflected the higher costs of
year-round town milk production. The relationship between
the town milk producer price and the manufacturing milk
price has been based on a change in. the average
manufacturing price for whole milk of one cent per kilogram
- J -
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of milk fat resulting in a change in the town milk price of
0.06 cents per litre.
Under the provisions of the Milk Act 1967 the New
Zealand Milk Board was required to organise the town milk
industry on an economic basis. The Board was charged with
providing an adequate supply of milk of good quality for
human consumption. To help ensure milk quality, the Board
operated a quality payment scheme with producer companies
(Tarrant, et.al. 1985). The Milk Board also carried out a
wide range of other administrative, promotional and
organisational duties. These included the arranging of
supply contracts with milk producer companies as well as
negotiating local cartage and special distribution
allowances. Regular reports to Government were made on the
adequacy of the town milk producer price and recommendations
were made on the consumer price.
The Board also controlled and maintained the milk
vending service. The Board set the standard for vendors,
and allocated and regulated the milk delivery rounds.
The consent of the Board was required to establish and
operate a milk station. Each milk treatment station had a
defined area in which to operate. To discourage uneconomic
capital investment by milk stations, the Milk Amendment Act
of 1980 gave the Milk Board increased powers. It also
allowed the Board to close uneconomic milk treatment
stations (eg. Raetihi).
Most of the Milk Board's funding was from a statutory
levy on town milk sold in New Zealand. All milk sold by
producer associations to milk treatment stations was levied
0.8 cents per litre (February 1987). The same levy was
applied to town milk used in the manufacture of ice cream.
Cream sold by milk stations to vendors was levied at 8.Q
cents per litre. (It takes ten litres of milk to produce
one litre of cream.)
Total annual expenditure of the New Zealand Milk Board
in the last two years of its operation was $3.98 million
(1985-86) and $3.64 million (1986-87). Its major expenses
were for administration, staff salaries, office rent, power
and cleaning, etc (New Zealand Milk Board, 1987).
Marketing and promotion expenses ($1.47 million in
1986-87) were financed from the milk pool account. This
amoupt represented the difference between the amount
recovered from the consumer price and the seasonal costs of
producing and distributing milk and cream for the year.
The Milk Board membership had a wide industry
representation. It was comprised of ten members appointed
by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries .. The term of office
was three years although members could be reappointed.
- 5 -
Three of the Board members were producer representatives and
two members were nominated by the Dominion Federation of
Milk Vendors (Inc.) Other members included one nominated by
the Executive Committee of the N.Z. Federation of Milk
Stations Inc.; one member represented (and was also a member
of) the N.Z. Dairy Board; one nominated by the Municipal
Association of N.Z. and the N.Z. Counties Association Inc;
one member representing consumers interests and the
Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries (or his
nominee) .
Each year the Milk Board allocated each producer
association a set daily amount of milk (called the nominated
quantity). The producer associations guaranteed that
throughout the year their farmer members would meet their
quotas which made up this daily liquid milk requirement.
The nominated quantity was market related and varied
according to the previous year's milk sales.
Each town milk farmer received a "town milk" payment
for quota milk. During spring and summer (September to
January), the payment was made for 117 per cent of the quota
amount, while during the remaining part of the year
(February to August), the payment was for 110 per cent of
the quota amount. Some of the extra milk produced by the
above quota allowances was used for cream production (cream
was not included in the nominated quantity). The remaining
"surplus" milk was sold at the (lower) manufacturing milk
price. Therefore, part of the above quota allowance
resulted in a supplementation of producer incomes. This
cost was calculated by the Board to add up to 1.8 cents per
litre (about three per cent) to the consumer price of milk.
The above quota allowances were first introduced in
1943 when milk demand exceeded supply. In recent years the
si~uation has been very different. Since 1976, when the
consumer price of milk doubled from 4 cents to 8 cents per
600 ml bottle, milk demand has steadily fallen. This has
meant that many farmers now produce more mi}k than is
required for town milk delivery. Any extra milk which was
produced over the 10 and 17 per cent allowances was known as
super surplus milk. The producer received the manufacturing
milk -price for it.
For the year ended 31 August 1987, 406,949,898 litres
of milk was eligible for the town milk price. Of this total
only 83 per cent (336,466,168 litres) was sold as town milk.
The remainder was used in associated products (eg. cream
sales of 9,617,518 litres) or sold to manufacturing
companies.
2.2 Milk Treatmen~ Stations
While the industry was administered by the Milk Board,
milk treatment stations were granted an exclusive area of
control. There was therefore no competition for the supply
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and processing of town milk. The financial viability
treatment stations was preserved by a payment
allowance or margin. These margins were controlled
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
of the
of an
by the
The Secretary of Trade and Industry aggregated the
assets and costs of the 16 largest treatment stations and if
necessary adjusted the margin payouts to provide a return of
15 per cent on assets. For the smaller treatment stations
the Milk Board was able to pay a special treatment margin to
ensure the continued viability of the operation.
The Milk Board did have a limited policy of
encouraging cost savings by rationalization where milk could
be bought into a region at a lower cost than processing it
in the local area. For this to proceed there had to be
clear benefits to the consumer (eg. a reduction in the
consumer price) and an adequate supply had to be guaranteed.
One example was the closure of Raetihi station. This
resulted in lower consumer prices in that area.
2.3 Producer Prices
In the year ended 31 August 1987 the final national
average producer price for finest grade milk was 23.394
cents per litre. This price was based on the manufacturing
farm gate value of 320 cents per kilogram of milkfat for
whole milk. The town milk standard seasonal producer prices
for finest grade milk were:
Spring and Summer
(1 Sept 1986 - 31 Jan 1987)
Autumn
(1 Feb 1987 - 30 Apr 1987)
Winter
(1 May 1987 - 31 Aug 1987)
Cents/~jt~~
18.82
23.34
30.12
Certain regions received additional special production
allowances during the six autumn and winter months (Table
1). These additional funds were paid by the Milk Board to
regions where the basic town milk producer price was not
sufficient to ensure a continuing supply of town milk. In
recent years the Government limited this fund to a maximum
of $1 million per year. In administering this fund the
Board had to ensure that (regardless of other criteria) no
region received an allowance greater than the cost of
bringing in milk from a near-by alternate source of supply.
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Table 1
Additional Local Prices-or Special Production
Allowances Over the Town Milk Production Price
For The Year Ended 31 August 1987. a
Rotorua
Gisborne
Hawkes Bay (excluding Maharahara)
Blenheim
Nelson
Grey District
Christchurch
Ashburton
South Canterbury
North Otago
Dunedin/Balclutha
Central Otago
Southland
0.80
2.50
1. 25
1.25
1.25
0.60
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.80
3.50
3.25
aCents per litre over six autumn and winter months
Source: N.Z. Milk Board Annual Report for the year ended
August 1987
The national town milk producer price established a
base upon which regional allowances could be set to cover
the variations in the cost of production. However, in some
regions the number of farms producing town milk is falling
rapidly. There are many explanations for this including the
future uncertainty of the industry, falling farm incomes and
milk station closures. If present trends continue, town
milk (especially during the winter months) will need to be
supplied from outside certain regions (Tarrant, et.al.1985).
The areas under risk include:
Northern Hawkes Bay,
Wellington 50 km zone,
Grey District,
Central Otago and
South Canterbury (Waimate).
2.4 Milk Production Quotas
In order to
milk farmers have
paid for seasonal
helped compensate
winter milk. In
minimum quantity
year.
obtain milk for 365 days of the year, town
traditionally received higher prices than
manufacturing supply. This higher payout
for the extra expenses needed to produce
return farmers undertook to supply a set
of milk (called a quota) each day of the
- 8 -
The classical economic approach to dealing with high
winter production costs is to raise the consumers price in
the winter and to lower it in the summer (Harris and
Chandler, 1960). Consumers would respond by increasing
consumption in the summer and restricting it in the winter.
A perceived problem with this was that price fluctuations
may lead to an overall fall in total milk consumption and to
avoid this, the consumer price has been kept constant while
varying the price to the producer over the season.
A requirement of the quota system has been the supply
of a set quantity of milk each day over the whole year.
Although the summer price may have been perceived as "high"
in relation to costs, while the winter price may not have
fully compensated for winter production costs, farmers were
compelled to produce on a year round basis by the quota
system. Over the whole year, the farmer returns were
presumably sufficient to offset costs and provide an income
at least equivalent to what could have been obtained from an
alternative activity.
The town milk quota scheme restricted the quantity of
milk which would be accepted at the Town Milk,price and
producers benefited from the higher and stable prices. In
New Zealand, quotas have not been freely traded and this has
led to producers increasing their returns by producing
additional milk above their quota. Some of this milk
(within the 10 and 17 per cent margins) receives the Town
Milk price, while above the allowed margins, the
manufacturing milk price is paid.
If a producer is unable to meet quota requirements
there have been two potential costs associated with this
shortfall. These are the revenue losses from foregone
sales, and the risk of permanently losing some quota
allocation. This wou19 result in a loss of revenue in the
current year and in all future years (Alston &
Quilkey,1979) . In New Zealand the penalties imposed on
farmers who were unable to meet their daily quota varied
with supply associations. Some associations first
calculated each farmers' average daily quota supplied during
two winter months. If this average figure was less than the
allocated daily quota, then the farmer lost the shortfall
the following year. Farmers were not penalized for dropping
below their quota for a few days in the winter provided they
were above quota later in the month.
The town milk producer insures against a shortfall by
either:
(a) producing more than the quota (the most commonly
chosen option) or
(b) adopting more costly input combinations. (eg.
feeding concentrate foodstuffs), or
(c) adopting other production techniques (eg. using
a wintering barn) .
2.5
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The Value of Town Milk Quotas
Town milk producers are paid a premium over the prices
paid for manufacturing milk. Because of this, people
outside the industry sometimes believe that the "ownership"
of a town milk quota yields a significantly higher net
return than would alternative uses of the producers'
resources. If this was so, .the quota rights would acquire a
capital value. This value would attach to the "owner" of the
quota and if associated with the farm, would be absorbed
into the values of capital assets such as land and
buildings. If the farm was sold (provided the quota went
with the farm) the value of the farm would be higher than an
equivalent near-by non-quota farm. In recent years there
has been little evidence that town milk farms have commanded
a capital value premium.
In New Zealand, unlike many overseas countries, the
absorption of town milk quota rights into the capital value
of the farm is confused by the different ownership of the
quota. In most regions quotas have been owned by the supply
association. Quotas were seldom left with the farm in the
event of a change of ownership (except for a few small
districts such as North Otago). Since the mid 1970's, when
consumer milk prices started rising and demand steadily
fell, quotas from farmers selling their farms or ceasing
town milk production, have been absorbed by the supply
association. This helped cushion the steady fall in quota
which remaining producers had available.
Because quotas have not been owned by the farmers,
this has prevented quotas being traded. When quotas are
freely traded (known as an open quota system) resource mis-
allocation costs are reduced. When quotas are sold in
continuously divisible units of quantities and time, more
efficient low cost producers can purchase more quota rights
(Veeman, 1982). Often farmers with high fixed costs of
unused capacity or producers with potential to achieve
economies of·scale will be willing to pay more per unit for
more quota rights. The advantage of allowing quotas to be
traded is that supplies of milk may be obtained at a lower
cost.
In the past, quotas were allocated amongst town milk
producers according to criteria other than economic
efficiency. Following the steady downturn in demand over
the last 13 years there has rarely been any extra quota
available for the low cost efficient producer. Between 1979
and 1986 farmers received some increase in the national
average price of milk in nominal terms (Table 2). There was
a substantial price decrease in 1986/87. The price
increases have generally only been small and reflect changes
in the price of manufacturing milk. However, the price
increases were not sufficient to match inflation. Cost
- 10 -
increases and falling quota quantities have therefore
resulted in town milk supply becoming less profitable over
recent years.
Table 2
The National Average Farmer's Price for Finest Grade Milk
Cents Per Litre
1979 - 80
1980 - 81
1981 - 82
1982 - 83
1983 - 84
1983 - 84
1984 - 85
1984 - 85
1985 - 86
1986 - 87
15.1271
18.7347
22.9593
22.9593
23.4303 (to 29 Feb 1984)
24.0405 (1 March to 31 August 1984)
24.0645 (to 8 Nov 1984)
26.8563 (9 Nov 1984 to 31 Aug 1985)
27.2897
23.3940
Source: N Z Milk Board Annual Report for the year ended
August 1987.
~s consumer demand for milk has fallen, there has been
a slow decline in farm quotas. Since this decline began
nearly 500 farmers have given up town milk production. In
1976-77, when milk doubled in price from four cents to eight
cents a 600 ml bottle, there were 1728 producers. By
1985-86 the number of producers had fallen to 1,254 and the
price of milk to the consumer had reached 45 cents a bottle
(On 1 Oct 1986).
'There have been many reasons why these farmers gave up
town milk production. A few were made redundant as a result
of milk station closures (eg. Raetihi). Some would have
sold their farms. Others however, would have chosen to
change to factory supply production. This change in dairy
farm management is costly. There is a loss of earning
capacity from some of the herd due to the down time involved
in changing calving patterns. There is often a need for
increased on-farm capital investment. More land may be
needed, more stock may have to be purchased or bred, the
milking shed may need to be expanded and more 'plant
purchased.
A number of town milk farmers are financially locked
into all year round milk supply. They often have limited
land with small quotas. In many regions, especially in
areas subjected to cold winters, there are few alternative
farming options offering a similar return for those farmers
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limited resources. In Dunedin in 1985-86 for example, 71
per cent of the 80 quota holders held quotas of less than
650 litres. While some of these small farmers could
withstand the cost of changing to seasonal supply, many
could not. If these farmers' quotas were lost following
deregulation, Dunedin city may be forced to look elsewhere
to meet its winter milk demand.
In 1986-87 there was a significant downturn in the
payout for town milk pro~uction. Compared with the previous
year the producer's milk price fell by nearly 15 per cent.
This low price occurred (coincidentally) during a period of
great change to the structure of the town milk industry.
Discussions on the deregulation of the industry had been
steadily progressing since the release of the report from
the Industries Development Commission in October 1985. A
number of farmers believed that deregulation (along with low
producer prices) would seriously impair the future
profitability of town milk production. Some farmers reacted
by giving up their town milk quotas, and others, especially
those on smaller farms looked for ways of expanding their
capital resources (eg. by buying more land). This extra
investment would make it easier in the future to transfer to
factory supply dairy production.
There was a risk that these changes could lead to a
less than adequate supply of town milk, given the existing
price structure, especially in the winter months. To date
~his has not happened although in a number of regions (eg.
Ashburton and North Shore) the existing farmers are
producing close to their maximum capacity. It is unlikely
that these farmers could further expand their production if
one of their number gave up town milk. In more and more
regions it is proving increasingly difficult to find other
dairy farmers interested in taking on a town milk quota.
There is much uncertainty among farmers about the future of
the industry (especially after full deregulation in 1993).
There is uncertainty about the costs of winter milk
production. From their annual financial statements factory
supply farmers know the costs for their own dairy management
farming system. Each town milk farmer's profit and lo~s
account lists costs for twelve months, but for a shorter
period (eg. winter) it is more difficult to isolate costs.
An attempt was made to quantify the differences in
costs between the two dairy farming systems in a comparative
study undertaken in the South Auckland region for the
1984-85 year (Moffitt, 1986). In that year the final
manufacturing price of wholemilk was 396 cents per kilogram
of milkfat ( or 16.7231 cents per litre at 4.1 per cent fat
content). The average final price for finest grade milk was
26.8563 cents per litre.
- 12 -
Before reviewing the results of this study, it is
worthwhile to first consider the differences in payout
between the two enterprises. Had the average town milk
farmer received the manufacturing price (of 16.7231 cents
per litre) for all milk supplied for six summer months (eg.
September to February), how much more would he have needed
during the six winter months to achieve the same total
revenue for the year? Throughout the year the ~verage price
to the town milk farmer was 26.8563 cents per litre, If he
was paid only 16.7231 cents for the six summer months he
would have had to·be paid an extra (26.8563-16.7231) 10.1332
cents per litre for his six months winter milk. This equals
36.9895 cents per litre (assuming the summer and winter
quantities were the same).
What if the company paid the town milk farmer the low
manufacturing price for nine months? To achieve the same
annual revenue, he would have had to be paid the average
price of 26.8563 cents plus 30.3996 cents or a total of
57.2559 cents per litre for the three winter months. (As
the farmer received 10.1332 cents per litre less for three
quarters of the year, this loss (of 10.1332 x 3) would have
to be added t~ his average payment of 26.8563 cents for the
other quarter of the year.)
At a 4.1 per cent fat test, 57~2559 cents per litre
represents $13.96 per kilogram of milkfat.
The 1984-85 survey of 26 South Auckland town milk and
31 factory supply dairy farms highlighted the cost
differences between the two farming systems. Total
expenditure per dairy productive hectare for the average
town milk farm was 134 per cent greater than the nearby
average factory supply dairy farm. Almost every expense was
higher on town milk farms including labour (up 63 per cent) ,
administration (up 61 per cent), operating expenses (up 38
per cent), and overhead expenses (up 29 per cent). Part of
these higher costs relate to the need to supply year-round
milk with much of the difference in costs relating directly
to winter milk production. However, differences in farming
efficiency may also contribute to the differences in the
cost of production.
The higher payout received by the town milk farmer
helps compensate for these higher costs. However, in South
Auckland in 1984-85 this extra payout did not quite match
the higher costs. In that year the average town milk farmer
recorded an average net farm income per dairy productive
hectare of $534. This was marginally, lower than the
neighbouring average factory supply farmers result of $552.
A similar result was recorded from a survey conducted the
previous year ($416 and $494 per dairy productive hectare
respectively) (Moffitt, 1985).
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These results from the South Auckland region indicate
that in this region, the quotas owned by town milk farmers
did not result in additional profits. Compared with
investing in a factory supply dairy farm, the future earning
value of these town milk quota rights is negative. (This
comparison does not however consider differences in land
values associated with such investments.)
On town milk farms both production and carrying
capacity per hectare is less than neighbouring seasonal
supply farms. Results from two separate studies of the two
types of dairy farms highlighted these differences in
production. One study was undertaken in Manawatu (Anon,
1987) and the other in South Auckland (Moffitt, 1985). The
town supply farms in both regions carried 20 per cent fewer
cows per hectare and produced 17 per cent less milkfat from
seven per cent less milk per hectare. The lower milkfat
figure probably reflects the predominance of Friesian cows
in town milk herds compared with a higher proportion of
Jersey cows on factory supply farms.

CHAPTER 3
CHANGES IN LEGISLATION
In 1985 a detailed and comprehensive examination of
the town milk industry was undertaken by the Industries
Development Commission (Tarrant, et. ale 1985). The
Commission concluded that the industry was one of the most
regulated primary sector industries in New Zealand. While
calling for deregulation, the Commission believed that it
was in the public interest to retain certain features of the
present system, namely a horne delivery service and a central
authority.
Following further discussions, Government passed a new
Act (The Milk Act, 1988) which partially deregulated the
Town Milk industry. Before the Milk Act carne into effect on
1 April 1988 the Government had introduced a number of
policy changes for the milk industry. The object was to
encourage rationalisation. The produ~tion of town milk was
deregulated from 1 September 1987. Milk processors were
required to make their own arrangements with producers for
the supply of milk in their region. The prices which were
negotiated with the producers did not necessarily need to
follow the previous Milk Board pricing formulas. Nor did
processors have to maintain the additional seasonal
percentages (of 10 and 17 percent). A minimum price of
15.14 cents per litre for town milk was s~t by the Minister
of Agriculture.
Control of milk vendors passed from the Milk Board to
local processors. Processors were able to offer contracts
to the vendors they wished to keep. Those who wished to
leave the industry or who were not offered contracts were
entitled to an exit package. This included a refund of the
vendor's goodwill and $1,000 in lieu of chattels. Vendors
who failed to receive a new contract were able to stay until
the new Milk Act' carne into force. A number of vendors were
upset over the low compensation offered. They were also
concerned that individual vendors were not entitled to have
a contract offered to them. They believed the new policy
removed their right to a livelihood.
A major objective of the new Milk Act is to subject
the Town Milk industry to the disciplines of a more
competitive trading environment. Previously the tight
regulatory conditions imposed by the Board may have
restricted the optimum use of industry resources. By
allowing commercial decisions to be made under more open
market conditions, the interests of consumers and the
economy were expected to be better served., However, the
Bill stopped short of full deregulation (at least until
1993) by imposing one key provision; the maintenance of a
horne delivery service. Processors are obliged to provided a
home delivery service in exclusive ~esignated zone.
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Under provisions of the Milk Act the responsibility
for production, pricing, promotion and the distribution of
town milk passed from Milk Board control to the private
sector. The Board was replaced with a new body called the
New Zealand Milk Authority. This three person body has the
role of monitoring the industry, licensing milk processors,
and allocating horne delivery districts. It also determines
the margin. between the retail price of milk in supermarkets
and the price of horne delivered milk.
Only one processor may hold a licence for a horne
delivery district, although a processor may hold a licence
for more than one district. Each processor is provided with
monopoly rights to the horne delivery trade within a defined
region. The licence may be cancelled if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that "the processor is not at
all times providing sufficient milk to satisfy the
requirements for milk of all the consumers of any of its
home delivery districts" (So11 Milk Act, 1988). When the
Act came into force, incumbent processors were granted
licences.
The Milk Authority has interpreted the Act as
providing the power to decide on the frequency of delivery
of milk to consumers and the times when milk is to be
delivered. In Wellington city and parts of Auckland the
daily horne delivery service has been cut back. Some vending
districts are difficult to service because of their size or
terrain. These vendors are delivering every second dayo In
these regions it is often difficult to obtain new vendors to
replace those leaving the industry. There is a risk in a
partially deregulated market of processors restricting home
supplies and diverting demand towards the bulk market. This
can be profitable to the processor because it avoids paying
the vendor's margin. Rather than cut back the vendors daily
delivery on these difficult milk rounds, the processor does
have the choice of another strategy. To attract vendors to
the more difficult milk rounds, a higher payment could be
offered (Easton, 1988). Without competitive pressure from
outside c~mpanies (or enforcement by the Milk Authority) ,
the processor is unlikely to choose this option.
Under special circumstances
modify home delivery districts.
maximum price differential between
outlet supplied milk.
the Authority is able to
It can also determine the
horne delivered and retail
The Act expires on 31 March 1993. This sunset clause
was included to emphasise that the Act offers only temporary
protection for the horne delivery service. If the vending
service is able to meet the needs of consumers and improve
its efficiency, then it need not fear total deregulation.
However, as noted by the Commerce Commission (Vautier et.al.
1988), the home delivery service is politically sensitive
and deregulation of the horne delivery service may not end as
planned.
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There has been criticism over the inclusion of a
sunset clause in the Milk Bill (Turnbull,1988;
Kimpton,1988). The intention of this clause is positive.
It provides a time frame for the industry to improve its
performance. However, the projected expiry date of the
legislation seriously concerns milk vendors. They face an
uncertain future with no apparent support for the horne
delivery service beyond 1993. One of the main intentions of
the Act was to preserve the horne delivery service but this
future promise of complete deregulation may lead to a
reduction in current vendor commitment. The ~ilk Authority
may not be able to act quickly to curb inadequacies in horne
delivery. Milk stations have the right of appeal should
their performance be questioned but there is a risk that the
consumer may have suffered for a long time before the
results of the appeal are released (Mitchell, 1988).
However, it should be noted that the Government
included the continued protection of the horne delive~
service in the Milk Act rather than continued protection for
existing milk vendors. The horne delivery service which
continues after the expiry of the Act may be radically
different to the present service and will exist in response
to consumer demand rather than Government decree.
Among the administrative changes to the milk industry
that carne into effect on 1 September 1987 were some that
affected milk processing companies. Limited competition
among processors was encouraged by allowing them to compete
for supermarket and the bulk user trade (mainly hospitals
and large institutions) outside their horne delivery
district. Supermarkets and bulk users (i.e. buyers of more
than 1500 litres of milk per week) are permitted to buy from
any licensed processor. The price at which the processor
sells milk to supermarkets is unrestrained but the
supermarket retail price must not be less than a fixed
margin (currently three cents per litre) below the lowest
horne vendor's retail price set in any of the supplying
processor's borne delivery districts. This supermarket
competition is designed to help constrain processor's retail
prices. If a processor can supply milk to a supermarket in
another zone at a lower price than the near-by processor,
this competition should help keep retail prices competitive.
It was noticeable that prior to the takeover of 60
percent of Auckland Co-op Milk Corporation (ACMP) by NZ Co-
op Dairy Co (NZCDC) in Auckland, competition for the
supermarket trade in Auckland city did not occur. There was
a total lack of competition, even near the border of the two
companies exclusive horne delivery zones. The two companies
also increased the price of bottled milk on the same day.
There was more co-operation than competition evident between
these two Auckland processor companies.

CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRY RESPONSES SINCE DEREGULATION
4.1 Milk Demand and Consumer Prici~
The demand for milk in New Zealand is very price
inelastic. A study of the price elasticity of demand for
New Zealand town milk was published in 1984 (Brodie et.al.
1984). The result indicated that there are few substitutes
for fresh milk and milk is unresponsive to price change.
The price elasticity of demand of -0.066 means that a ten
per cent increase in the real price of milk would lead to
less than a one per cent fall in consumption. However,
this study of milk demand over a twenty year period to 1983
found that three quarters of the decline in milk consumption
could be attributed to milk price increases. The other
major reasons for the fall in milk consumption were the
decline in the proportion of children in the population and
seasonal factors. These results were consistent with
similar studies undertaken overseas.
This study concluded that other factors, such as
advertising and disposable income did not appear to have an
important influence on milk consumption. It was suggested
that because at the time of the study the period of media
advertising and promotion expenditure had occurred only over
the previous five years, further investigation would be
needed to determine the exact effect of advertising.
Since 1967 the consumer price of milk has steadily
increased (Table 3). Until 1986-87 total town milk sales
and consumption have continued to fall (Table 4). Consumer
demand peaked in 1974-75 at 134.7 litres per head. By
1986-87 demand had fallen to 101.9 litres per head.
Table 5 lists retail milk prices for car toned and
plastic bottled milk as at 1 February 1988. Alternative
packaging is now available in nearly all- districts
throughout the country. There is a wide range of prices
charged for one litre cartoned milk from 39 cents per litre
(in New Plymouth and Timaru) to 108 cents (in Alexandra) .
Milk in two litre plastic containers ranges in price from
180 cents to 207 cents. The variation in these prices shows
little evidence of competition in milk pricing by
processors. Compared with milk purchased in bottles (at
83.33 cents per litre equivalent), milk in alternative
containers is more expensive.
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Table 3
Consumer Prices of Town Milk in New Zealand
From
July 1967
February 1976
February 1977
May 1978
April 1979
February 1980
November 1980
August 1981
June 1982
March 1985
September 1985
October 1986
January 1988
Price Per
600 ml Bottle
~_~.D-ts
4
8
9
10
15
18
21
25
30
35
40
45
50
Price Per
Litre
Cents
--_.- -------
6.6667
13.3333
15.0000
16.6667
25.0000
30.0000
35.0000
41.6667
50.0000
58.3331
66.6664
74.9997
83.3333
Source: New Zealand Milk Board Annual Reports 1972 to 1987
Table 4
Total Town Milk Sales Per Year
August Year
1966-67
67-68
68-69
69-70
70-71
71-72
72-73
73-74
74-75
75-76
76-77
77-78
78-79
79-80
80-81
81-82
82-83-
83-84
84-85
85-86
-86-87
'000 Litres
345,384
345,133
352,713
364,950
375,906
382,348
394,228
410,232
422,634
414,410
399,469
395,383
386,292
375,008
365,887
357,849
352,762
350,354
349,422
339,338
336,466
Consumption Per Head
Dec Year (Litres)
122.2
123.5
124.8
127.6
129.4
128.9
130.1
132.5
134.7
131.6
126.7
125.4
122.6
118.5
114.5
113.5
110.8
106.2
105.5
102.3
101.9
Source: New Zealand Milk Board Annual Reports and
Mon~hly Abstract of Statistics
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Table 5
Retail Prices of Milk in Cartons and Plastic Containers
Milk Station 1 Litre Carton 2 Litre Plastic
Containers
(Cents Per Unit) (Cents Per Unit)
Kaitaia 95
Bay of Islands 90 180
Whangarei 90 180
Ruakaka, Waipa, etc. 98 196
Dargaville 192
Auckland AMC 90 180
Ambury's 90 180
Hamilton 90 180
Thames 93 186
Coromandel 95 190
Te Aroha 90 180
Whangamata 93 186
~V'ai tomo 190
Tauranga 90 180
Gisborne 100
Hastings 100 190
Maharahara 100
Taumarunui 98 200
New Plymouth 89
. Hawera 185
Wanganui 90
Masterton 100
Palmers ton North 95 190
Otaki 95 190
Hutt 95 190
Wellington 95 190
Blenheim 97 195
Nelson 195
Westport
Greymouth 100
Christchurch 100 200
Districts 100 200
Timaru 89 192
Oamaru 188
Dunedin 97 192
Alexandra 108 210
Balclutha 100 200
Invercargill 97 199
Bluff, Mataura 98 201
Riverton, Tuatapere 99 203
Te Anau, Lumsden 100 205
Athol, Kingston, Stewart Island 101 207
Source: New Zealand Milk Board. Annual Report for the
year ended August 1987.
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Deregulation has resulted in the. relaxation of many
controls within the industry. The relaxation of pricing
controls from September 1987 has allowed processors to set
their own prices, but significant price changes have not yet
been evident. In the future the safeguards of limited
competition for the supermarket trade may be insufficient to
prevent monopoly pricing by processors. Milk has few close
substitutes and demand shows little response to price
change.
The January 1988 increase in the milk price to 50
cents per 600 ml bottle was approved by the Minister of
Agriculture with some reluctance. In a letter to the Milk
Board (quoted in the Milk Industry Bulletin of February
1988) the Minister pointed out "that the increase to 50
cents was not a justification for processors to increase the
price to that level, but was recognition of the need to have
more flexibility in the pricing of milk". The Minister
acknowledged that some cost increases had occurred such as
the increase in milk vendors' margins but the benefit
'processors had gained from the reduction in Milk Board
levies should have more than offset those cost increases.
This demand for an increase in the milk price to 50
cents suggested that the government "objective of
competition in the industry is not being met", while the
Minister was disappointed at the lack of industry
competition he accepted that "companies are now operating
commercially and government is not involved in price
setting."
4.2 Alternative Packaging
Prior to 1 October 1986 alternative packaging of fresh
town milk was prohibited. Multi-trip refillable glass
bottles had been the traditional packaging and this had
helped protect the vendor system. Unfortunately this
protection had acted to restrict the rationalization of the
industry. The costs of distributing bottles over long
distances was high. Alternative packaging offered the
advantages to the industry of one-way transport and
convenience to consumers.
Since alternative packaging has been permitted there
has been a substantial capital investment by milk compariies
in cartoning machines and plast~c packaging lines. Milk is
now sold in a variety of sizes of cardboard cartons and
plastic two litre bottles. Previously supermarkets, because
of limited space, were less willing to handle milk in
returnable bottles. For the first time since the price of
milk started increasing in price (in 1975), milk consumption
has stopped falling and started rising. In the 1986-87
August year milk sales fell by 0.9 per cent. But for the
four months ending December 1987 milk sales rose by 1.9 per
cent. The introduction of alternative packaging may have
contributed to this increase in demand for milk. Consumers
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now have a greater freedom of choice in both form of
packaging and point of sale.
Increasingly consumers seem to prefer the new
packaging, especially two litre plastic containers. In
Auckland both milk companies introduced cartons and plastic
packaging. By November 1987 in Auckland, ten per cent of
town milk was sold in cardboard cartons, twenty-six per
cent in plastic two litre containers and sixty-four per
cent in glass bottles. In Tauranga the local milk company
began supplying milk in plastic pottIes in November 1987.
This was a response aimed at regaining their lost market
share from Tauranga supermarkets. NZCDC from Hamilton had
started supplying Tauranga supermarkets with milk in cartons
and plastic bottles. The Tauranga Milk Co had been
supplying cartoned milk for 12 months but within two months
of releasing milk in plastic bottles, consumers had
responded by buying 20 per cent of their milk in plastic
bottles and 16 per cent in cartons.
The home delivery service
alternative packaging although most
bottles.
also offers milk in
sales are still made in
The capital cost of blow moulding machinery needed to
produce plastic bottles is high. The plants purchased by
ACMP and PDL cost each company more than $3 million. Some
of the smaller milk processors have avoided this capital
cost by obtaining their supplies from other blow moulding
companies although moving empty plastic bo~tles incurs high
transport costs. To service the high fixed costs a plastic
packaging line requires increased throughput compared with a
cardboard carton line. The rationalisation of increased
throughput and other associated economies of scale allow a
processing company to compete in a neighbouring market for
bulk milk supplies. Small processors without plastic
bottles are at a disadvantage.
4.~ Entry Barriers to Other Companies
There are a number of reasons why other firms (eg. a
factory supply dairy company) cannot enter the town milk
market including the preservation of the market dominance of
existing town milk processing companies by the regulations
of the new Milk Act.
The entry barriers to the industry include (after
Bollard, 1988):
1. The difficulty of obtaining supplies of year-
round milk on a consistent basis.
2. Even if a new entrant had access to year-round
milk, it appears unlikely that the Milk Authority
would reallocate a home delivery district to a
new entrant.
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3. Entry to the supermarket or bulk user sub-market
requires a processing licence from the Milk
Authority. This will not be granted unless the
applicant has a viable home delivery district,
although this can be in another area. This
regulation prevents dairy manufacturing companies
with occasional surplus milk from acting as a
short term "hit-and-run" entrant.
4. Small processors with an existing town milk
processing station and a vending system may also
have trouble supplying supermarkets in another
district. The returns in the new market must be -
sufficient to overcome the transport barrier. It
may also be difficult to attract sufficient
additional milk (especially in the winter) from
their producers.
Processors located in more isolated districts may be
tempted to take advantage of the inelastic demand for milk
and increase the price of milk. This will incur
considerable monopoly rents at their consumers' expense.
A new entrant seeking access to the contestible section
of the market (including supermarkets) of another district
faces additional costs. These costs include not only
getting to the various supermarkets in the target city but
also maintaining the quality of the product. Milk demands
precis~ temperature (less than 4oC) and light control. To
help gain market share a new brand of milk would also
require extensive costly marketing and promotion support.
However, these "barriers" are similar to those facing other
perishable products and are not considered prohibitive.
While entry to the town milk bulk trade in another·
region seems possible, market penetration to this bulk
market (which only represents about ten per cent of the
total market) is likely to be limited. Entrants have to be
traditional processor co-operatives. If twelve month supply
is ~ought, the potential entrant has to obtain extra winter
m~lk and it also has to meet the various other costs such as
transporting the milk to the new market. These costs would
make entry uneconomic unless higher consumer prices are
being charged in the neighbouring region. If this was
happening then the incumbent processing company would have
been "enjoying very considerable monopoly rents.
Consequently the competitive pressure on the incumbent to
perform competitively, efficientlY, and minimize prices to
consumers would be very weak" (Bollard, 1988). However, if
supply for the summer only was acceptable to the purchaser,
a strong competitive situation could occur.
Supermarkets have the motivation to seek the least cost
supplier of milk. In an area such as Auckland where the
dominant processor has become NZCDC, a supermarket chain
could develop countervailing power (Vautier,et.al.1988l. In
a competitive retail
buy or contract with
this venture would
prices. The price
allow the supermarket
and the higher costs
run.
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environment a supermarket chain could
an outside processor. The success of
depend on how high NZCDC raised its
rises would have to be sufficient to
to overcome the transport cost barrier
of packaging and a smaller production
Some concern has been expressed over the extreme
difficulty potential processors would face trying to enter
the town milk industry (Turnbull, 1988). The new
legislation gives existing milk stations license to sell
milk within exclusive regions and fix their own prices
without any real competition.
4.4
After the initial deregulation of the milk industry in
1987, some Tauranga and Nelson supermarkets sold milk
supplied from processors outside their districts. The major
cost which tends to limit the expansion of this competition
for market share of milk supplied to supermarkets by "cross
border" processors is the cost of transport. Often
processing companies can achieve economies of scale by
increasing throughput. This can help offset the additional
costs (eg. transport) required to expand into another
district.
Milk is a bulky product which requires expensive
refrigeration storage. Supermarket milk is usually supplied
in cartons or plastic bottles because milk quality in glass
bottles is affected by display lights.
One effect of' the change in packaging has been some
relaxation of quality controls on retail milk. The quality
of some milk products in some regions, notably cartoned milk
purchased from shops and supermarkets, has been reported as
being poor. Previously the Milk Board maintained strict
quality controls and although these controls are still
maintained by processors, there has been a relaxation of
quality control by some retailers. Most processors now date
stamp their milk with a "Use by" (or "Best Before") date
instead of the date of bottling.
In Tauranga the milk supplied to supermarkets by NZCDC
had a "Use by" date 10 days after bottling. The local
Tauranga Milk Company had a "Use by" date which allowed a
shelf life of four days. The shopper when confronted with
both products in the one supermarket, tended to choose the
later date stamped product (i.e. the one post-dated ten days
ahead). The shopper expected the product with the later
date stamp to be fresher.
Most supermarkets prefer to
refrigeration storage space for high
rather than milk. The supermarkets
use their limited
profit margin goods
rely on receiving
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frequent deliveries of milk often twice or three times a day
especially on Thursdays and Fridays. It is convenient and
more efficient for the supermarkets to hold smaller milk
stocks and re-order from a near-by processor. The turn-
around response time is quicker from a closer milk station
than from one located over 100 kilometres away.
Milk has been supplied to some Tauranga supermarkets
from NZCDC in Hamilton. Initially this milk was being
received three days a week. Later deliveries were being
received daily on week days, although it later reverted back
to three days a week. To meet this outside competition the
Tauranga processing company hired a marketing manager,
introduced plastic bottles and also introduced a new
supermarket wholesale price to match the selling price of
NZCDC.
Although supermarket milk can be sold at three cents
per litre less, it is unlikely to be regularly discounted
and featured as a "loss leader" (Vautier et.al.1988). There
are many other more convenient grocery products which could
be used for this purpose. Supermarkets prefer to cater for
the weekly, high-volume shopper and milk is still thought of
as a daily purchase.
In Auckland around ten per cent of fresh milk sales
are made by supermarkets. The bulk user and supermarket
share of milk sales has grown quickly following limited
deregulation. However the growth of this market (the
"contestable" part of the market) has probably been due to
the introduction of alternative packaging (eg. cartons and
plastic bottles). Milk vendors are responding to this
competition ,from supermarkets by improving their efficiency
to protect their market share.
Overseas supermarket chains package milk under their
own house brand. In New Zealand the design of existing
supermarkets and the lack of bulk refrigeration storage
facilities restrict these stores from accepting milk in
large volumes. If the public become dissatisfied with the
home vending service more milk may be sold by the
supermarkets. If this trend develops supermarkets will
quickly construct new facilities to meet this new demand.
By then milk may be marketed by the larger supermarkets
under their own generic or house brand.
Before the deregulation of the industry the Milk Board
proposed that a national brand for milk and cream be
established. This would have saved costs in both packaging
and promotion. The two large Auckland companies rejected
this proposal and went ahead and established their own
distinctive national brand names. Among the many
independent North Island home delivery districts there has
been considerable cross-licensing of these brands. NZCDC
sells standard milk in containers using the "Springtime",
"Happy Valley", "Trim" and "Active" brands. Brand
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franchising arrangements by NZCDC have been negotiated with
seven of the eighteen independent North Island milk
companies. Processors in eight other North Island districts
have been licensed to use the ACMP "Country Maid" brand. In
the North Island 93 per cent of town milk is supplied by
processors using these brands.
The adoption of these national brands by other smaller
processors avoids the high printing and cartoning costs that
an independent brand would require. Some processors believe
that national branding is useful if it helps protect their
region against outside competition. One disadvantage is
that the brand licensor can put restrictions on the areas of
operation by the licensee. This restriction effectively
prevents any regional licensee from shipping milk into the
bulk markets controlled by NZCDC and ACMP (Bollard, 1988)
4.5 Milk Station Owners~~paD~~
Since the investigation by the IDC into the milk
industry, the processing sector has undergone some
rationalisation. While the investigation was proceeding,
there was uncertainty as to the extent of the proposed
deregulation of the industry. This resulted in only limited
milk station reconstruction and plant replacement although
by late 1986 a number of milk stations had installed
alternative packaging equipment.
There have been a number of milk station ownership
changes since 1985. Where more than one buyer has wanted to
buy the milk company, the final price paid for the company
assets and goodwill has tended to be higher.
The new Milk Act gives the Authority "very little
discretion in terms of licensing, modification of licenses
or exclusive milk zones" (Kimpton, 1988). It would be very
difficult for the Authority to admit a new entrant even if
the encumbrant processor's service is inadequate. Kimpton
believes "licences could attain a spurious value based on
unalienable rights bestowed by legislation". In the last
two years there have been a number of mergers and take-overs
of town milk processing companies by other dairy companies.
Some of the high prices which have been paid for these
companies with their exclusive milk zones, lends support to
this view.
A total of thirty-eight milk stations were operating in
August 1986. In the previous year Palmerston North had
purchased the assets of the Raetihi Pasteurised Milk Supply
Co Ltd, and closed it down. During 1986 both Tokoroa and K
B Dairies in Ashburton were closed down. The Ashburton
Company amalgamated with Timaru Milk Company.
On 1 December 1985 Rotorua Milk Company amalgamated
with NZCDC. The price paid of $1.7 million for all 20,000
shares was distributed among twenty-two suppliers. The
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Waikato Milk Company in Hamilton amalgamated with NZCDC on 1
June 1986. The forty-five town milk producers received
close to $151 per share.
In the South IsLand, Metropolitan
amalgamated with Canterbury Dairy Farmers.
Co also put in an offer to buy the 19,700
The successful bid of $690,000 by CDF
thirty-three producers (at $35 per share).
Milk (ChCh) Ltd
Tai Tapu Dairy
shares of Metro.
was shared among
From 1 September 1986 Warkworth Co-operative Milk
Producers Ltd merged with ACMP. During the 1986-87 year a
merger occurred between Milk Processing Palmers ton North,
Hutt Milk Corporation and the Wellington City Council.
These three companies combined to form a new company called
Capital Dairy Products.
In late 1987 three companies (Morrinsville-Thames
Valley Co-op Dairy Co, NZCDC and the Western Bay of Plenty
(Co-op) Milk Producers) were bidding for the shares of
Thames Valley Milk Producers Ltd. The directors of Thames
Valley Milk Producers decided to accept the $1.3 offer from
the nearby Morrinsville-Thames Valley company. There were a
number of reasons for this choice despite the higher bid
which had been offered by NZCDC. The nearby location of
Morrinsville-Thames Valley meant management control would
still remain in the region. The new owners also undertook
to continue with the twenty-one suppliers' existing town
milk contracts for three years. Each farmer's quota will be
adjusted each year depending on consumer demand. Had the
offer from NZCDC been accepted, not only would any local
regional control have been lost, but there was a real risk
that the Thames Valley Milk Producers plant would have been
closed. Future milk for the region would probably have been
supplied from Hamilton .. After NZCDC took over Rotorua" and
Tokoroa, both milk treatment plants were closed down.
The Whakatane company of Eastern Bay of Plenty Co-op
Milk Producers was also the subject of a takeover in 1987.
This company was approached by three potential buyers;
Western Bay of Plenty Co-op Milk Producers (the eventual
purchaser) I NZCDC and Morrinsville-Thames Valley. The
twelve suppliers from the Whakatane based company shared the
payment for the net realizable assets of the Whakatane plant
of close to $1.2 million. The plant was closed down in late
1987 and the bottling plant was later sold to Australia.
Ten of the twelve Whakatane suppliers transferred to
Tauranga.
The cost of this takeover by the small Western Bay of
Plenty company could have disadvantaged their own suppliers.
To avoid this, the Tauranga based company had their assets
valued and issued their own twenty-five shareholders with
ten year redeemable preference shares.
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There is often a strong relationship between the size
and type of dairy co-operative of the dominant company
involved in a take-over (or merger) and the consideration
given to existing town milk shareholders. When a small town
milk processing company takes over another, the existing
shareholders are often protected (eg. the Western Bay of
Plenty issue of redeemable preference shares). When a large
dairy co-operative (which is predominantly involved in
factory supply dairy production with only a few town milk
suppliers) takes over another town milk processor, the town
milk farmers from the parent company receive little extra
consideration. The small town milk sector has limited
representation on the Board of Directors of these large
manufacturing dairy companies.
A feature of the previous Milk Board's administration
was the protection it offered to producers. The
representation on the Board of industry representatives
meant that Board activities could be expected to be designed
to protect the existing industry (including producers)
interests while meeting other requirements imposed by
legislation. A number of major financial decisions, such as
the setting of the producer milk price, were handled by the
Board in Wellington. Since deregulation, producers (via
their farmer directors) have had to make all their own
decisions in a vigorous commercial world. In some regions
the producers' own futures have suddenly been constrained to
a two or three year time horizon. The assets of their own
company, which their milk has paid for over many years, have
sometimes been sold with limited opportunity for discussion
by producers.
4.6
There are a number of different ways of obtaining town
milk during the winter months. The current system of quotas
and 365 day production ensures a continual supply of good
quality mid-lactation milk. This production system has
worked well in the past but farmers, because of their high
sunk costs in their industry, will be reluctant to change.
The costs of transferring out of town milk supply are non-
recoverable.
Another possible way of obtaining town milk is to use
the low cost milk produced by factory supply farmers during
the warmer months of the year. Winter milk could be
supplied by other special winter milk producers. There are
some problems with milk quality at the start and end of
lactation from factory supply herds but this could be
overcome by using fresh mid-lactation milk from winter
milked herds during this period.
Compared with the
production system it has
still unproven) that there
farmer was given a winter
calve all the herd in the
existing year-round town milk
been suggested (although it is
may be some cost savings if a
quota only. The farmer would
autumn and nine months later dry
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the herd off in the summer. A number of farm management
advantages over year round supply may result. Stock
management would be easier with all the cows and heifers
calving at the one time. During the early summer as
lactation slows, more land could be set aside for silage and
hay winter feed conservation.
Another advantage of this winter quota system is its
ease of introduction to existing town milk farms. Under the
current 365 day quota scheme, farmers are obliged to provide
milk every day of the year. If the period of the new quota
scheme was limited to the winter and adjoining months (e.g.
March to' August) farmers could receive premium payments for
their milk for this period only. Any milk supplied during
the rest of the year would receive the manufacturing price.
Penalties, such as loss of future quota would apply only for
the winter months. The premium for winter milk would need
to be sufficient to encourage town milk farmers to change to
winter quotas.
Another option for winter milk is toned milk. If there
are insufficient supplies of fresh high quality winter milk,
the existing supply could be supplemented by toned milk.
Dried ingredients such as skim milk powder, buttermilk
powder and anhydrous milk fat could be combined with fresh
milk in a 40:60 or a 60:40 combination. It is claimed that
it is difficult to taste the difference between fresh and
toned milk.
Winter milk could be supplied from UHT milk, either
alone or as a supplement. This may be more expensive than
the current winter supplied milk. Another alternative is to
stop all winter milk production and supply reconstituted,
recombined or UHT milk.
A further option is to encourage the production of
winter milk in regions with the comparative advantage of
good winter grass growth. This milk can then be trucked to
other regions which have high winter production costs.
Tokoroa and R6torua are already being supplied with winter
milk from the NZCDC company at Hamilton. The current winter
milk being produced by the Tokoroa and Rotorua town milk
producers is diverted to nearby factory supply companies
4.7
Farmers have responded to the new deregulated
environment with varying degrees of confusion. The main
change affecting farmers is the change in the supervision of
the quota system from the Milk Board to the local processing
company. For many of the companies there has been no change
to the system which has operated in the past, i.e. the quota
system has remained unchanged. However, in other areas,
there have been ongoing discussions over possible changes in
the ways in which milk delivery to processors is to be
organised. The main option which appears to be gaining
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favour is the negotiation of a contract for supply of a
given quantity over the winter for a negotiated price.
These contracts can be with traditional town milk farmers or
with factory supply farmers who consider that the winter
supply price being offered is sufficient to cover their
winter production costs.
There are major costs associated with a change from
town milk supply to butter fat supply. These costs are
mainly associated with the loss of a large part of the
production for one year. Cows which are milked through the
winter cannot be brought back into production until the
following spring, resulting in a lag of some three to four
months. Winter production also reduces grass availability
in the spring and summer, meaning that seasonal supply of
butterfat in the first year of the change over will be lower
than the potential available.
The deregulation of the industry has brought about
rationalisation activities, particularly in the northern
part of the North Island, where NZCDC has become the major
supplier through a series of corporate takeovers. As a
result, suppliers to some of the smaller cooperatives which
have been absorbed have been told that they will not be
receiving any future quota allocations.· These farmers are
considering the options available to them but it is expected
that most of them will convert to butterfat supply.
It should however be noted that the farmer members of
cooperatives which have been purchased by NZCDC will have
received compensation as a result of the sale in proportion
to the quota they held with the cooperative. For some
cooperatives, the compensation was quite substantial.
A major effect of the deregulation process has been the
increase in uncertainty amongst farmers. Discussions with
farmers yield very little information on the effect of the
deregulation on the farm income or operation. However,
farmers consider that over the past few years there has been
a significant drop in profitability (not necessarily related
to deregulation) and as a result of this and the uncertainty
over future pricing arrangements, a significant number of
farmers are continuing to leave the industry.
The most likely outcome of the process· appears to be
the adoption of a winter milk production contract, at a
price which "compensates" for the cost of production over
this period. Such production will only occur on the most
suitable land with a climate which encourages some grass
growth over the winter. This means that the production of
winter milk will be mainly carried out on light land in warm
areas. Milk produced over the spring and summer will
attract factory supply (butterfat) prices and the concept of
specialist town milk producers will disappear.
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In areas south of Hamilton, there is onging uncertainty
concerning the outcome of the deregulation process. The
transfer of milk supply responsibility to the processing
companies appears to have been received by some companies
without much enthusiasm. In the past, the companies have
only been responsible for the administration of a system
controlled by the Milk Board. The change in the control
with the increased responsibility of the companies has
caused some difficulties for some companies in that they
have not been in a position to effectively manage the new
system. This has led to increased uncertainty amongst
farmers. In addition, some farmers feel they have not
received fair treatment from the companies in that the
prices being paid have not retained the old linkage with the
butterfat price. However, there is little justification for
any linkage of this type as the products are sold in
different markets, ie. local fresh milk cf exported dairy
products, and the returns are likely to be different.
In the southern North Island area, there is some
concern amongst farmers with respect to the degree of
influence being exerted by particular companies. For
example, it is considered by some farmers that the Manawatu
company has gained significant influence over the Wellington
area, perhaps to the detriment of the original Wellington
suppliers.
From the discussions held, it appears that the
Palmers ton North / Wellington area is continuing to develop
new town milk supply farms with some very large herds being
established particularly near Palmers ton North. The
Manawatu company has emerged as the dominant organisation in
tpe southern North island area. Supplies of town milk are
not necessarily adequate, especially given the poor grass
growth conditions o"ver the autumn and winter and it was
considered that supplies may be required from NZCDC. The
"problems" of "excessive" influence by butterfat producers
do not appear to be as severe in this area.
In the Christchurch area, the dominant organisation in
Canterbury Dairy Farmers (CDF). All Christchurch town milk
is supplied by this company. The butterfat company is
Alpine Dairy Products Ltd., which is an amalgamation of Tai
Tapu Dairy Company and Temuka Dairy Company. Alpine does
not have a town milk "licence". No changes have been made
t~ the farmer arrangements (quotas) in the Christchurch
area.
In South Canterbury,
achieved on a year round
supplied to Alpine and CDF.
appear to be evident.
adequate milk supply has been
basis with surplus milk being
Winter supply problems do not
Since deregulation, there appears to have been little
change in the farmer arrangements. The number of suppliers
had fallen substantially over previous years and a core of
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suppliers remain in the area. It is anticipated that CDF
might shortly express interest in becoming involved in the
Timaru area. There is a strong possibility that farmers
might be favourably inclined towards moving the herd to
Autumn calving as milk production over the winter is less
difficult. However, a surplus during the winter can already
exist and demand for winter milk would depend on the
situation in Christchurch.
In the Dunedin Area, concern was expressed over the
potential for competition from CDF, especially as the
Dunedin processing plant will shortly require an extensive
upgrade. However, there have been few changes in the system
in the Otago area. The butterfat factories and the town
milk company have joint ownership of the local cheese
factories and any surplus town milk goes for cheese
manufacture.
There did not appear to be very much potential for
exclusive winter milk production and it was anticipated that
the supply arrangements would continue much as they had in
the past. Changes would depend upon the possible influence
of CDF.
Invercargill is in a similar position to Dunedin but
the pressure on the local suppliers is likely to be less.
If competition were to begin, it is expected to come from
CDF but the longer distance would mean that the Invercargill
people would be able to compete effectively.
Few changes in the supply system are expected in this
area. The local company directors consider that as a result
of being able to make decisions about their own operations,
the efficiency of the industry will improve. However, this
is not likely to bring about changes in on farm practices.
In summary, the effeGt of the deregulation process has
been most significant in the North Island, particularly
around Auckland, where NZCDC has been active in acquiring
smaller town milk supply companies and in changing town milk
supply arrangements. It appears that the main changes are
likely to be the discontinuation of quotas for year round
town milk supply and the introduction of winter supply
contracts for any farmers who are willing to calve their
herds in the autumn for this purpose. "Town Milk" will then
be supplied from spring carving herds, whether the herd was
traditionally used for butterfat production or town milk
production, during the summer and autumn calving herds
during the winter. It is anticipated that this may lead to
some increased variability in the quality of the milk
supplied, as there are significant differences in the milk
quality from different parts of the lactation time.
In the southern part of
are likely to be fewer
arrangements continuing. Some
the North Island, the changes
with traditional town milk
changes in company ownership
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have been occurring but these changes have largely been
within the traditional town milk sector rather than
involving the factory supply sector. New large town milk
supply herds are being established as there is the potential
for a shortage of milk in this area. There is some
speculation concerning the possibility of NZCDC supplying
milk to the Palmers ton North / Wellington area during times
of local milk shortage.
In the South Island, there appears to be few changes
occurring. CDF is the dominant comapny and there is some
expectation that CDF could become involved in milk supply
down to and including Dunedin. Changes in farmer
arrangements have not been reported.
In the Otago area, the local milk supply company has
arrangements with the local cheese factories for the use of
surplus milk. Shortages of milk do not appear to be a
problem. There was no reported discussion of possible
changes to the town milk supply system as the present year
round quota system appears to be suitably efficient in this
area. Exclusive winter supply is considered to be a more
difficult proposition than current arrangements. There was
some discussion of the possibility of CDF becoming involved
in Dunedin but transport costs would appear to weigh against
this.
In Invercargill, little appears to have changed with
respect to farmer operations. The potential for competition
from outside the area is quite limited with Dunedin
apparently not interested in acquiring a share of the
Invercargill market. Deregulation appears to have been well
received by the local company with the potential for more
efficiency based on local decision making being stressed.
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